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THE CRIMINAL FORFEITURE




The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)1
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)2 statutes, en-
acted in 1970, included with the conventional criminal penalties
of fine and imprisonment a new sanction aimed specifically at
organized criminal activitiess-criminal forfeiture.4 Criminal for-
feiture attempts to deter crime by compelling the forfeiture of
assets used in connection with or derived from criminal enter-
prises,5 in this way taking the profit out of crime.e The congres-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
3. Conviction under RICO requires that the defendant have engaged in a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). CCE requires that the defendant have
engaged in a "continuing criminal enterprise ... in concert with five or more other per-
sons." 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1982).
4. See Comment, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organ-
ized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 Am. U.L. REv. 227, 229 (1982) (defining criminal forfeiture
as "the post-conviction divestiture of the defendant's property or financial interest that
has an association with his criminal activities").
5. The criminal penalties provision of RICO provides in part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and
shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law-





(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt col-
lection in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. 111984); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. 111984) (CCE crimi-
nal forfeiture provisions).
6. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1199
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sional architects of criminal forfeiture hoped to attack the eco-
nomic foundations of crime in a way that more traditional
penalties had failed to do.
7
In 1984, largely motivated by perceived weaknesses in the
criminal forfeiture statutes,8 Congress passed the Comprehen-
sive Forfeiture Act," substantially amending the forfeiture provi-
sions of RICO and CCE. The Department of Justice's interpre-
tation of these enhanced forfeiture provisions to permit the
seizure of attorneys' fees paid by persons convicted under RICO
or CCE has caused a great deal of controversy.1" In the Depart-
617]; see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
225], reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3374. S. REP. No. 225, in
discussing amendments to the criminal forfeiture provisions, stated:
Profit is the motivation for [racketeering and drug trafficking], and it is through
economic power that it is sustained and grows. More than ten years ago, the
Congress recognized in its enactment of statutes specifically addressing organ-
ized crime and illegal drugs that the conviction of individual racketeers and drug
dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the economic power bases of
criminal organizations or enterprises were left intact, and so included forfeiture
authority designed to strip these offenders and organizations of their economic
power.
Id.
7. In reporting on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated:
Obviously, the time has come for a frontal attack on the subversion of our eco-
nomic system by organized criminal activities. That attack must begin, however,
with the frank recognition that our present laws are inadequate to remove crimi-
nal influences from legitimate endeavor organizations ...
• . . What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that
will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-
being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of eco-
nomic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
S. REP. No. 617, supra note 6, at 78-79.
8. In discussing its reasons for amending the criminal forfeiture laws, Congress cited
a report by the General Accounting Office (GAO), which found that out of over 5000
drug cases in the period from 1970 through 1980, courts had applied criminal forfeiture
in only 98 cases, and the total value of actual and potential forfeiture amounted to only
$2 million, less than a heroin trafficker might make in a month. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF
THE U.S., ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING
10 (1981), cited in S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6. Further, the GAO reported that crimi-
nal forfeiture had failed to attack the economic base of organized crime, finding no sig-
nificant forfeitures of proceeds of crime or business interest. Id. at 11.
The report concluded that this failure could be attributed to two major factors. First,
federal law enforcement authorities had not aggressively pursued forfeiture. Id. at 16.
Second, the forfeiture provisions contained ambiguities that hampered their effective-
ness. Id. at 30.
9. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 301-322, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (1984) (codified in
scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES ON FORFEITURE OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES (1985) (hereinafter cited as JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES], re-
printed in 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 2, 1985). For commentary arguing in favor
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ment's view, criminal forfeiture of attorneys' fees finds support
in the theory that the money used to pay these fees was derived
from or used in a criminal enterprise, and therefore represents
forfeitable ill-gotten gains." Since the passage of the 1984
amendments, the courts have disagreed over whether attorneys'
fees are subject to forfeiture. 2
This Note argues that the criminal forfeiture provisions of
RICO and CCE should not apply to attornfeys' fees legitimately
paid for services rendered. Part I examines the distinction be-
tween criminal and civil forfeiture, focusing particularly on for-
feiture of property transferred to third parties. Part II discusses
ways in which forfeiture of attorneys' fees adversely impacts the
attorney-client relationship. Part III suggests a construction of
the criminal forfeiture provisions that avoids the problems
presented by attorneys' fees forfeiture but maintains criminal
forfeiture as a deterrent to crime.
I. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
RICO and CCE represent a departure from the generally ac-
cepted American application of forfeiture. Traditionally, courts
have characterized forfeiture as either in rem or in personam. 1
of applying criminal forfeiture to attorneys' fees, see Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV.
493 (1986); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1171 (1986).
11. Riley, U.S. Changes Fee Forfeiture Policy, Nat'l L.J., July 29, 1985, at 32, col. 2
(comments of William Landers, Justice Department Criminal Division special counsel).
12. Compare United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986) and United
States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) and United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) and United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that attor-
neys' fees paid by persons convicted under RICO or CCE are not subject to forfeiture)
with Payden v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2,
1985), 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.) (suggesting in dicta that RICO and CCE forfeiture
does apply to attorneys' fees), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
13. Justice Story's opinion in The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), contains
the classic enunciation of this distinction:
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party
forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly
speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the
judgment of conviction. It is plain from this statement, that no right to the
goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere
commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction of the
offender. The necessary result was, that in every case where the crown sought to
recover such goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right by
producing the record of the judgment of conviction .... But this doctrine never
1201
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The RICO and CCE statutes are unique in that they authorize
in personam forfeiture as a criminal penalty, as opposed to the
more common civil application of forfeiture in rem. An impor-
tant distinction between these two forms of forfeiture is their
treatment of transfers to third parties. Despite expressing a de-
sire to use forfeiture as a criminal penalty, Congress, in amend-
ing RICO and CCE, used civil forfeiture theory to apply criminal
forfeiture to third parties who ordinarily would not be subject to
such forfeiture.
A. The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Forfeiture
The American attitude toward criminal forfeiture has tradi-
tionally been hostile." Although the courts have accepted civil
forfeiture,16 particularly in the areas of customs and narcotics
regulation,16 no federal law before RICO and CCE applied for-
feiture as a criminal penalty.1 7 Criminal forfeiture is distinct
was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on
the revenue side of the Exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this,
whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se.
Id. at 14.
14. The Constitution abolished forfeiture of estate, the common law precursor of
criminal forfeiture, as a punishment for treason. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The
Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Per-
son attainted."). The First Congress prohibited forfeiture of estate as a criminal punish-
ment with the Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3563 (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987)). The current version provides,
"No conviction or judgment shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate."
The Justice Department took the position that, in enacting criminal forfeiture, RICO
repealed 18 U.S.C. § 3563 by implication. Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (letter
from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to subcommittee chairman John
L. McClellan). But criminal forfeiture under RICO is distinguishable from common law
forfeiture of estate. The penalty of forfeiture of estate resulted in forfeiture of all one's
property. The scope of criminal forfeiture under RICO and CCE is narrower, requiring
forfeiture only of property connected to criminal activities. See United States v. Grande,
620 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974);
Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
16. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (Controlled Substances Act for-
feiture provision); 19 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982) (forfeiture of vessels used in smuggling); id.
§ 1595a (forfeiture of conveyances used to transport contraband).
17. Hearings, supra note 14, at 407. But see Note, Bane of American Forfeiture
Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 779 n.73 (1977) (contending that the
Justice Department's assertion that RICO was the first instance of federal criminal for-
feiture overlooks an important federal case holding that forfeiture under a federal em-
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from civil forfeiture both in the means with which it seeks to
achieve its objectives and in those objectives themselves. In ad-
dition, the in rem/in personam distinction affects the extent to
which the government can seize property transferred to third
parties. RICO and CCE extend criminal forfeiture beyond tradi-
tionally accepted limits on the application of forfeiture to third
parties.' 8
The most important difference in means between civil and
criminal forfeiture is that civil forfeiture proceeds in rem, acting
against the property, while criminal forfeiture acts in personam
directly against the convicted defendant.19 In rem forfeiture is
grounded in the legal fiction that the property itself is guilty of
wrongdoing.2 0 Under this personification fiction, courts have
long held that forfeiture takes effect at the moment property is
used in connection with a crime and that the government's title
vests at that time.2 ' This "relation back doctrine" voids all
transfers made subsequent to the crime22 and allows the govern-
ment to take possession of property transferred to parties who
themselves have had no involvement with the criminal activity.
23
Property subject to forfeiture is at least the nominal subject of
the in rem forfeiture action.2 4 Guilt or innocence of the individ-
bargo statute was to be imposed as part of a criminal action, see United States v. Mann,
26 F. Cas. 1153, 1155 (C.C.D.N.H. 1812)).
18. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977) (Noting the unusual use
of forfeiture as a criminal penalty, the court stated, "Such a penal foray bespeaks a need
for circumspection."), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).
19. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 13-14 (1827).
20. Comment, supra note 4, at 232-33; Note, supra note 17, at 784.
21. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
22. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971);
United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890). Though courts have read relation back
into in rem forfeiture statutes, some civil forfeiture statutes provide for this explicitly.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (Supp. 11 1984) ("All right, title, and interest in property
described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commis-
sion of the act giving rise to forfeiture .... ").
23. Such an application of forfeiture leads to admittedly harsh results at times. See
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685-90 (1974), and cases cited
therein.
Remission, in cases where forfeiture seems unduly harsh, was available under common
law, see id. at 689 n.27. In other instances, a statute may provide some relief. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. § 1618 (Supp. 111984) (providing for remission of forfeiture under the navigation
and customs laws when a court finds that "forfeiture was incurred without willful negli-
gence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to
violate the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify ...
remission").
24. Often the property itself is named as a "party" in the civil forfeiture action. See,
e.g., United States v. One 1977 Pontiac Grand Prix, 483 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Il1. 1979);
United States v. One Mannlicher-Carcano Military Rifle, 250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex.
1966).
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ual possessing the property in question is not an issue in a civil
forfeiture action, and courts have routinely rejected the claimed
innocence of the possessor as a defense to in rem forfeiture.25
Courts have similarly rejected the argument that civil forfeiture
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of
law,21 reasoning that the owner's rights are not before the court
in a civil forfeiture action.
Criminal forfeiture takes a very different approach. Unlike the
civil forfeiture statute, which provides for the forfeiture of prop-
erty used in the commission of a crime, the RICO and CCE stat-
utes direct their sanctions against individuals who have violated
their provisions.28 As a criminal penalty, forfeiture under RICO
and CCE should only take effect after there has been a criminal
conviction.2 9 RICO and CCE involve criminal rather than civil
forfeiture, so the innocence of the defendant is very much an
issue.
3 0
Because criminal forfeiture is contingent upon a finding of
personal guilt, under traditional in personam forfeiture theory,
relation back cannot divest the property rights of innocent third
party transferees.3 1 To the extent RICO and CCE involve crimi-
25. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974); United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
26. See Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926) (holding that a state forfeiture
statute depriving an innocent owner of property as a consequence of illegal acts commit-
ted by one entrusted with property does not violate due process under the fourteenth
amendment); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (holding
that forfeiture of a car used in violation of federal law was not unconstitutional even
though the owner had no knowledge of its illegal use).
27. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974); Gold-
smith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921); United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
28. Compare RICO, which applies its penalties to "[whomever] violates any provi-
sion," 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. 11 1984) with the language of a typical civil forfeiture
statute, which provides that "[tihe following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United
States and no property right shall exist in them." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982 & Supp. II
1984) (forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substances Act).
29. United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Before a
person's interest in an enterprise can be declared forfeited under RICO, that person
must be convicted of an offense prohibited by RICO."); see also United States v. Thevis,
474 F. Supp. 134, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1979), afl'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); Comment, RICO Forfeitures and the Rights of Innocent Third Parties,
18 CAL. W.L. REV. 345, 350-51 (1982).
30. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
31. Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAm L.
REV. 165, 285 (1980):
This "relation back" principle is inapplicable to RICO in personam forfeitures
because the doctrine is grounded in the essential nature of in rem forfeiture
actions. In those actions, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant because the
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nal proceedings and third parties are not even before the court,
the court is unable to adjudicate the rights of these parties.
32
Even if third parties were before the court, their lack of involve-
ment in any crime should act as an absolute defense to any
criminal penalty. To penalize criminally those who have commit-
ted no crime exposes in personam forfeiture to due process at-
tack of the kind rejected in connection with in rem forfeiture.
3
1
The two forms of forfeiture also differ in their objectives.
Courts commonly view civil forfeiture as a remedial measure34
and criminal forfeiture as punitive in nature.3 5 Typically, civil
forfeiture applies to instrumentalities of crime, such as illicit
drugs 6 or weapons, 37 which are inherently harmful. In this way,
courts have characterized civil forfeiture as an exercise of the
state's police powers.3 The kinds of property forfeitable under
the civil statutes, by their very nature, justify the extension of
civil forfeiture to third party transferees as a means of removing
thing to be forfeited is considered the offender. Thus, the "relation back" doc-
trine cannot be employed in an in personam action in which forfeiture is depen-
dent on the guilt of the former owner. Accordingly, because RICO established an
in personam forfeiture procedure, the innocence of the present owner must con-
trol if the defendant does not retain an interest in the property.
(footnotes omitted).
32. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1979) ("Mandatory for-
feiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) follows conviction of the activities set forth in § 1962..
. To the extent that those 'heirs, successors, and assigns' are not before the Court, there
can be no forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 since there can be no conviction under
§ 1962.") (citation omitted), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825
(1982).
33. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
34. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984);
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
35. See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[RICO forfeiture]
provisions operate as an additional penalty against the defendant .... "); see also United
States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
But the Supreme Court has indicated dissatisfaction with this remedial/punitive dis-
tinction. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22
(1971) ("When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that
they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a
criminal enterprise.") (footnote omitted); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
634 (1886). For a criticism of the remedial/punitive distinction, see Clark, Civil and
Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN.
L. REV. 379, 475-81 (1976).
36. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (subjecting all controlled
substances used in violation of the law to forfeiture).
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1982) (subjecting any firearm or ammunition used in
violation of any criminal law to forfeiture).
38. United States v. Jenison, 484 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D.R.I. 1980) ("[Florfeitures are
not punishment for criminal activity, but rather an exercise of the police power of the
state to confiscate property that was instrumental in a crime so as to prevent the contin-
uance of unlawful acts."); see also United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d
931, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972).
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such dangerous instrumentalities from public circulation and
preventing their use in future crimes.
3 9
No such justification exists, however, for applying criminal
forfeiture to third parties. The object of forfeiture under RICO
and CCE is to punish those found guilty of violating their provi-
sions, thus acting as an added deterrent to crime.40 To force
third parties, who themselves have not violated any law, to for-
feit property transferred to them by people who have committed
a crime does not further the aim of deterrence.
B. The RICO and CCE Amendments
In 1984, Congress amended RICO and CCE to address the
problem of defendants' transfer of property prior to conviction
in order to avoid forfeiture." The result, the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984,42 explicitly incorporated relation back as
part of criminal forfeiture.'3 Congress disclaimed any desire to
broaden the substantive reach of criminal forfeiture, stating that
its intention in amending RICO and CCE was only to clarify
ambiguities in the forfeiture provisions.4 The practical effect of
this amalgamation of criminal and civil forfeiture, however, was
to extend criminal forfeiture to third parties not previously sub-
ject to such forfeiture.
In enacting RICO and CCE, Congress acknowledged the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal forfeiture' 5 and also recog-
39. This justification becomes more tenuous, however, when extended to "derivative
contraband," which is forfeitable only because of its illegal use. An example of derivative
contraband would be a vehicle used in transporting narcotics. See generally Smith, Mod-
ern Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposal for Reform, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 661
(1978).
40. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Veon,
538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
41. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 3379.
42. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 301-322, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57.
43. The criminal forfeiture provisions as amended provide:
All right, title, and interest in property ... vests in the United States upon the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such prop-
erty that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may
be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered
forfeited to the United States ....
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. II 1984); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. II 1984) (criminal
forfeiture provisions of CCE).
44. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3375.
45. Id. at 193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3376.
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nized that the government's power to follow assets into the
hands of third parties is not unlimited in a criminal action.46
Congress limited the reach of criminal forfeiture by providing
that a transferee can avoid forfeiture if he can establish that he
was a "bona fide purchaser . . . who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was sub-
ject to forfeiture."4 7 But even with this provision, the amended
RICO and CCE statutes are inconsistent in their use of forfei-
ture as a criminal penalty. First, as amended, RICO and CCE
apply forfeiture to persons who have not violated their substan-
tive provisions. Second, the amendments require persons seeking
to avoid the imposition of the criminal penalty to prove their
innocence rather than requiring the government to prove their
guilt.
The language exempting the bona fide purchaser from forfei-
ture provides no protection to the attorney representing a client
charged under RICO and CCE. To the extent that money used
to pay the lawyer is connected to activity forbidden by RICO or
CCE, that money is subject to forfeiture under the relation back
provisions,48 unless the lawyer can prove that he was reasonably
without cause to believe the money was subject to forfeiture.
Though the amendments do not explicitly address the question
of forfeitability of attorneys' fees, preamendment cases have
held that knowledge of the contents of the indictment is suffi-
cient to put the attorney on notice of the government's claim to
forfeiture.49 Whether or not the attorney is held to notice of for-
feiture, it seems highly unlikely that the lawyer whose client is
charged under RICO or CCE will be able to meet the standard
set by the statutes.50 Adequate representation requires full
46. Id. at 208, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3391.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. 11 1984); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. II 1984).
48. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[A] literal
reading of [RICO and CCE] would seem to encompass the legal fee.").
49. United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
Interpreting RICO's "reasonably without cause" language, the court in United States
v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985) stated that, in amending the RICO
provisions, Congress must be presumed to have been aware of existing case law and that
the amended statutes must be read in light of that case law.
50. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("No
one is more on notice of likelihood that the money may come from such prohibited activ-
ity than the lawyer who is asked to represent the defendant in the trial of the indict-
ment."); see also United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[Dlefense
counsel... could not have been unaware of the possibility that the property conveyed to
his law firm in return for legal services may have represented the profits of ... [a]
continuing criminal enterprise."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984).
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knowledge about the client's case,"1 which, in a RICO or CCE
case, would necessarily include knowledge about the client's as-
sets. Further, to require the lawyer to divulge knowledge about
his client's assets would require the disclosure of information
that is at least arguably privileged.
52
Congress did not intend to eliminate the distinction between
civil and criminal forfeiture. The legislative history of RICO and
CCE indicates that this distinction was an important factor mo-
tivating Congress to amend the statutes.53 Both with the original
forfeiture statutes and the 1984 amendments, Congress ex-
pressed a desire to create new criminal penalties that might ef-
fectively address the profit motive of narcotics selling and other
organized criminal activities.5 4 Rather than rely on existing in
rem forfeiture statutes,55 Congress chose instead in personam
forfeiture, seeing special advantages in a penalty aimed directly
at specific individuals.5 " With criminal forfeiture, Congress be-
lieved it was creating a completely new mechanism for dealing
with the problem of organized crime.57 The practical impact of
the amendments has been to blur the distinction between civil
and criminal forfeiture and to apply a criminal penalty against
individuals who have committed no crime.
II. THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE ON THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
Besides general due process concerns about application of
51. AMERICAN BAR Assoc., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 3.2, at 122 (1974) (project on standards for Criminal Justice):
(a) As soon as practicable the lawyer should seek to determine all relevant
facts known to the accused. In so doing, the lawyer should probe for all legally
relevant information without seeking to influence the direction of the client's
responses.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to instruct the client or to inti-
mate to him in any way that he should not be candid in revealing facts so as to
afford the lawyer free rein to take action which would be precluded by the law-
yer's knowing of such facts.
52. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
53. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 193, 196-97, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 3376, 3379-80 (comparing civil and criminal forfeiture).
54. Id. at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3374; see also 116
CONG. REC. 35,193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
55. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 6, at 79-80 (1969); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at
193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3376.
56. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 3376.
57. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 6, at 79-80.
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criminal penalties to innocent third parties, RICO and CCE pre-
sent special problems when the third party is a lawyer and the
property to be forfeited has been transferred as payment for le-
gal services rendered in a RICO or CCE defense. The adversary
system depends on the fair and equal representation of opposing
parties. Application of forfeiture to attorneys' fees distorts the
adversary system in favor of the prosecution in three ways: for-
feiture infringes the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed
right to counsel, undermines the attorney-client relationship,
and opens the door to prosecutorial abuse.
A. Right to Counsel
The application of criminal forfeiture to attorneys' fees may
make it impossible for the RICO or CCE defendant to get legal
representation. Where the court enters a restraining order"
preventing the defendant from transferring assets, the court will
also appoint counsel for the defendant who is unable to pay for a
lawyer.5 If, however, the court enters no restraining order and
the defendant retains the use of his assets until his conviction,
he faces a dilemma. The defendant, having ample funds availa-
ble to retain counsel, cannot qualify as indigent, but may be un-
able to find a lawyer who, knowing that his fees will be subject
to forfeiture if his client is convicted, will take the case. 0
To the extent that a lawyer will be unwilling to take on a
RICO or CCE case, forfeiture will prevent the defendant from
retaining the counsel of his choice. The defendant's right to
counsel of choice, although not absolute, is an essential element
of the protections of the sixth amendment.6 ' One accepted limi-
tation on the defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice is
that he have the necessary financial means. 2 The indigent de-
fendant, though he has a right to counsel, is limited in deciding
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1) (Supp. 11 1984) provides in part, "Upon application of the
United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execu-
tion of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availa-
bility of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section .... See
also 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (Supp. II 1984) (CCE forfeiture provisions).
59. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
60. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
61. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
53 (1932).
62. Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. In-
man, 483 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir. 1973).
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who that counsel will be." Some courts have compared the
RICO defendant to the indigent and have rejected the defend-
ant's right to counsel of choice in RICO and CCE cases."' One
court has reasoned that because rights to the defendant's assets
are not resolved until after the conclusion of the criminal pro-
ceeding, a court is unable to determine with any certainty that
the assets belong to the defendant.66 Therefore, because the
right of an indigent to choose his own counsel is a qualified one,
prohibiting the transfer of assets does not infringe upon the de-
fendant's rights. This argument fails to recognize, however, that
until the defendant has been convicted, the government has not
established that the assets do not belong to the defendant. The
argument also overlooks the fact that RICO and CCE are dis-
tinctly criminal statutes and that forfeiture operates upon a
finding of personal guilt.6
A second qualification on the right to choose one's own coun-
sel is judicial economy. 7 Typically, courts deny the defendant's
right to counsel of choice because that choice would disrupt the
orderly administration of justice.6 8 Because the application of
forfeiture to attorneys' fees will actually result in greater delay,
the judicial economy rationale does not justify infringement of
the right to counsel of choice. By making it more difficult for the
defendant to find an attorney, forfeiture increases the time
63. United States v, Hampton, 457 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.) ("It is well established
law that an indigent does not have the absolute right to a counsel of his own choosing.")
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. White, 451 F.2d
1225, 1226 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (noting that the Criminal Justice Plan for the
Sixth Circuit provides that the defendant "shall not be permitted to make the selection
of any attorney to represent him"); see also United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478-79
(7th Cir. 1979) (listing a number of plans that have been adopted by the federal courts
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act that specifically preclude the defendant from mak-
ing the choice of the lawyer who will represent him).
64. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that a
restraining order preventing the defendant from transferring assets does not deprive him
of counsel, but only of counsel of his own choice).
65. Payden v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2,
1985), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1985).
66. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
67. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v.
Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
68. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The right [to retain
counsel of one's own choice] 'cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an
orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their
inherent powers to control the same.' ") (quoting Smith v. United States, 288 F. 259, 261
(D.C. Cir. 1923)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); see also United States v. Inman, 483
F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that denial of continuance, requested so that de-
fendant could be represented by counsel of his choice, was not abuse of discretion).
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before a case can come to trial. If the defendant has an ongoing
relationship with an attorney, 9 and if that attorney will not de-
fend the client in the criminal action because of the threat of
forfeiture, the defendant must find a replacement and this
wastes time. The new attorney will need more time to prepare
the defense.
The nature of RICO and CCE litigation makes the right to
retain counsel of one's choice more critical in these than in many
other kinds of cases. RICO and CCE cases are generally com-
plex, involving grand jury proceedings and protracted litiga-
tion.70 To place the primary responsibility for these cases with
court-appointed counsel risks exhausting the resources of an al-
ready greatly overburdened public defender system." One court
has suggested that a court-appointed counsel may be unable to
mount an adequate RICO defense.7
69. For example, defense counsel in United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D.
Colo. 1985), had previously represented the defendant in two cases brought by the gov-
ernment. Defendant Gerald Leo Rogers' Memorandum Brief in Support of (1) His Ob-
jection to Plaintiff's Petition for an Order Restraining a Transfer or Other Disposition of
Property or Other Financial Interests in Certain Financial Enterprises; and (2) His Mo-
tion for an Order Excluding Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 27, id.
70. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985).
71. See generally N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR (1982). In
surveying various public defender systems around the country, Professor Lefstein
concluded:
The decision to furnish counsel to the accused in criminal and juvenile cases is
a matter of federal constitutional right, not simply of grace. Yet, as documented
in this report, meaningful compliance with the Constitution is often absent due
to inadequate funding. Indeed, public defender and assigned counsel programs
experience virtually every imaginable kind of financial deficiency. There are
neither enough lawyers to represent the poor, nor are all the available attorneys
trained, supervised, assisted by ample support staffs, or sufficiently com-
pensated.
Id. at 56 (citation omitted); see also AMERICAN BAR Assoc., GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS
IN INDIGENT DEFENSE SPENDING (1982) (transcript of a hearing, during the annual confer-
ence of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, on the crisis in indigent fund-
ing); The Criminal Defense Crisis, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Indigent De-
fense in Crisis, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
72. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985); see also United
States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 264 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting):
There is no dearth of competent counsel for the rich in our society. But no one
can say that the same is true for the indigent. The inadequate representation
received by the poor is universally recognized . . . . And although the commit-
ment and competence of court-appointed counsel has improved markedly over
recent years, particularly with the development of public defender systems, its
effectiveness is still handicapped by unmanageable caseloads, insufficient sup-
port services, inexperience in criminal trial practice, lack of independence from
the judiciary that controls the appointments and fixes compensation, and inade-
quate levels of funding and fee schedules.
See also Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976);
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B. Attorney-Client Relationship
The sixth amendment guarantees more than the right to rep-
resentation by a lawyer at trial.73 The defendant is constitution-
ally entitled to effective assistance of counsel. 7  The develop-
ment and maintenance of a trust relationship between lawyer
and client is essential to effective representation. 7" The applica-
tion of forfeiture to attorneys' fees chills the attorney-client rela-
tionship in two respects. First, the prospect of forfeiture of fees
presents the lawyer with a serious conflict of interest. Second,
forfeiture inhibits the free flow of information between the client
and his attorney.
To subject attorneys' fees to possible criminal forfeiture cre-
ates a contingent fee arrangement.7 6 The lawyer who successfully
defends his client will be paid while the lawyer whose client is
convicted will lose his fee. Such a possibility may tempt the law-
yer to compromise his client's interest and negotiate a guilty
plea that does not involve forfeiture." To avoid such potential
conflicts, the canons of legal ethics strictly prohibit contingent
Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead
End?, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 9 (1986).
73. Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1321 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[J]udicial refinement of
the right to counsel concept suggested that the mere representation by counsel, per se,
would not always satisfy minimal due process standards.") (citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that an order preventing de-
fendant "from consulting his counsel 'about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess
between his direct- and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of
counsel"); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967) (holding that an attorney
must prosecute appeal of an indigent client with the same degree of zeal that he would
that of a paying client); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that the
appointment of his attorney to represent a co-defendant violated the defendant's right to
assistance of counsel); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that when an attorney for a criminal defendant sleeps through a substantial portion of
the trial, such conduct is "inherently prejudicial").
74. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
75. See Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Basic trust between
counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance
of counsel."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("The relationship between attorney and client is highly confiden-
tial, demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work together har-
moniously.") (citation omitted). But see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (hold-
ing that the sixth amendment does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between
an accused and his counsel).
76. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
77. Id. See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (advancing the view that "[the] guilty plea system leads even
able, conscientious, and highly motivated attorneys to make decisions that are not really
in their clients' interests").
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fee arrangements in criminal cases.7" The application of criminal
forfeiture to attorneys' fees places the lawyer defending a RICO
or CCE defendant in the position of having violated this ethical
rule.
The forfeiture statutes give an attorney a strong incentive to
remain ignorant about certain facts of his client's case. To avoid
forfeiting his fee, the attorney must demonstrate that he was
reasonably without cause to know that the property used to pay
the fee was subject to forfeiture. 79 The attorney must choose be-
tween his own pecuniary interests in collecting his fee and his
duty to be fully knowledgeable about his client's case.80 Applica-
tion of criminal forfeiture is inimical to the kind of uninhibited
communication so necessary to the attorney-client relationship.
The attorney-client privilege encourages full disclosure and com-
munication between client and attorney.81 In order to make the
showing necessary to avoid forfeiture, the court may require that
the lawyer disclose information that is at least arguably pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.82 As a general rule, the
attorney-client privilege does not protect fee information. 3 An
exception to this general rule exists, however, when the "disclo-
sure of such information would implicate that client in the very
criminal activity for which legal advice was sought. 8 4 To the ex-
tent that the disclosure of fee information reveals the existence
of unaccounted-for assets, this exception applies. Just as forfei-
ture encourages the lawyer to remain ignorant about the origins
78. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1983) ("A lawyer shall
not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect ... a contingent fee for representing
a defendant in a criminal case."); see also United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp.
194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
79. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
81. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). For examples of state laws on attorney-client privilege, see CAL.
EVID. CODE § 954 (Deering 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20 (West 1976); N.Y. CIv.
PRAC. LAW § 4503 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986).
82. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985).
83. United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, va-
cated in part on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 888
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
84. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation
omitted); see In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981). But see Payden v. United States (In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985), 605 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y.) (rejecting
the incrimination rationale for protecting fee information in such circumstances), rev'd
on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
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of his client's assets, so it also encourages the client to withhold
this information."6
C. Prosecutorial Abuse
Because of its broad language, commentators have criticized
RICO for raising the possibility of prosecutorial abuse. 6 To the
extent that the criminal forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE
apply to attorneys' fees, they pose a similar threat. One cannot
assume that prosecutors will abuse their power under the crimi-
nal forfeiture statutes. Nevertheless, the possibility of abuse that
these statutes raise ought to be enough to prevent an interpreta-
tion of RICO and CCE that threatens the attorney with a possi-
ble loss of fees.
Criminal forfeiture allows the prosecutor to interfere with the
defendant's choice of attorney. Through strategic use of re-
straining orders to freeze a defendant's assets, the prosecutor
may make it difficult, if not impossible, for the defendant to find
an attorney to take his case."8 By preventing the defendant from
choosing his lawyer, the government can dictate, if not who the
attorney will be, at least who he will not be.8 9 Wielding the pos-
sibility of forfeiture, the prosecutor is able to relegate RICO and
CCE cases to overworked public defenders' offices where they
may be overwhelmed by the state's superior resources.90
In response to the particular burdens that the forfeiture provi-
sions place on attorney-client communications, the Justice De-
85. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976):
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more
readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in
the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer
and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.
86. See generally Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of
RICO, 65 IOWA L. REv. 837 (1980); Tarlow, supra note 31.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We note,
however, that the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse where a pros-
ecutor attempts to apply the statute to situations for which it was not primarily in-
tended. Therefore we caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO."), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
88. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("ITihe
constitutional problem is not one of choice of counsel; nor is it one of getting retained
lawyers to work. The problem is the unlikelihood of obtaining a lawyer at all if the
lawyer will incur forfeiture of his fee upon the client's conviction.") (emphasis in
original).
89. See Riley, U.S. Changes Fee Forfeiture Policy, Nat'l L.J., July 29, 1985, at 3, col.
1, 32, col. 2 (comments of Ivan Fisher, defense counsel in the Badalamenti case).
90. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
1214 (VOL. 19:4
Attorney Fee Forfeiture
partment has established a set of guidelines designed to ensure
the uniform application of criminal forfeiture." These guidelines
provide for centralized decisionmaking by requiring the approval
of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division
* before a U.S. Attorney's office either institutes proceedings to
forfeit an asset transferred to a lawyer as legal fees or enters an
agreement to exempt such an asset from forfeiture.2 The guide-
lines make clear, however, that even those assets transferred for
legitimate legal services actually rendered will be subject to for-
feiture if the attorney either knows or has reason to know that
an asset represents proceeds from an illegal activity.9 3 The
stated policy of the Justice Department is to seek forfeiture only
when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the attorney
either has actual knowledge or reason to know that an asset has
been derived from criminal activity.9 4 Reasonable grounds must
be based on information other than the compelled disclosure of
confidential communications.9 5 The guidelines qualify this pro-
tection greatly, however, by stating that fee information gener-
ally is not privileged." The protection offered by the guidelines
is further undercut by the Department's disclaimer that "they
are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to cre-
ate any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by
any party in any matter civil or criminal, nor do they place any
limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the De-
partment of Justice. ' 97 Taking the forfeiture decision away from
individual U.S. Attorneys may provide some protection for the
constitutional rights of RICO and CCE defendants. But the ex-
tent of this protection in the hands of a central authority sus-
ceptible to political pressures is questionable. The government's
promise to make more judicious use of forfeiture with respect to
attorneys' fees does not alleviate the problem. The threat of for-
feiture, at least as much as its application, serves to deter attor-
neys from representing RICO or CCE defendants.
91. See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 3003.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3004.
94. Id.
95. Id. The guidelines require that the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division authorize any subpoena to an attorney for fee information. The four prerequi-
sites to authorization are: first, the information must not be privileged; second, reasona-
ble attempts to obtain the information from alternate sources must be exhausted; third,
there must be reasonable grounds to believe the information is needed; and fourth, the
need for the information must outweigh potential adverse effects on the attorney-client
relationship. Id. at 3007.
96. Id. at 3007. But see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
97. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 3003.
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A second mechanism for potential abuse involves the govern-
ment's use of its subpoena power to compel an attorney's testi-
mony relating to fee arrangements with the client. Such infor-
mation is typically sought either as a prerequisite to the
government's assertion of its claim of forfeiture or as evidence of
unaccounted-for assets of the defendant. Such a subpoena not
only has an adverse effect on attorney-client communications,9 8
but compliance with the subpoena, preventing the attorney from
representing the client," results in prejudice to the client's in-
terests. 100 The subpoena gives the prosecutor the power to dis-
qualify opposing counsel almost at will, as well as to interfere
actively with the attorney-client relationship.'01 Here, too, the
Justice Department has said that it will limit its use of the sub-
poena against defense attorneys,0 2 but to depend on the prose-
cutor's wise use of discretion offers the RICO or CCE defendant
little protection. 03
III. A SUGGESTED CONSTRUCTION OF THE CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
STATUTES
Forfeiture of attorneys' fees raises serious constitutional ques-
tions, both with regard to the due process rights of third par-
ties 0 4 and the defendant's right to counsel. 08 Wherever possi-
ble, the Court seeks to avoid any construction of a statute that
raises a constitutional question. 06 An interpretation that ex-
98. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
99. See Roe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe), 759
F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Thus, by calling an attorney as a witness against his client,
the Government is surely setting the stage for the attorney's ultimate disqualification."),
vacated on other grounds, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
100. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 195, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding
that prejudice to the defendant because of a subpoena served on his attorney, likely to
result in the attorney's disqualification after the attorney had spent nearly six months in
trial preparation, "will be very great").
101. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.),
vacated and withdrawn upon indictment, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982):
When a subpoena is issued against an attorney in an ongoing attorney-client
relationship, the attorney may well be placed in the position of becoming a wit-
ness against his client or risking contempt. In either case, there is a strong possi-
bility that a wedge will be driven between the attorney and the client and the
relationship will be destroyed.
(footnotes omitted).
102. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
103. See supra text accompanying note 97.
104. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
106. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953) ("[I]f a serious doubt of consti-
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empts from forfeiture attorneys' fees legitimately paid for legal
services rendered in connection with a RICO or CCE defense
avoids such problems. By limiting this exemption from forfei-
ture to reasonable attorneys' fees, transfer to the attorney is pre-
vented from becoming a mechanism whereby RICO and CCE
defendants can escape the sanction altogether. Such an interpre-
tation is consistent with the legislative history of the 1984
amendments as well as the notion that the attorney is entitled to
a reasonable fee for his services.
A. Legislative History
An examination of the legislative history of the 1984 amend-
ments shows that Congress was particularly concerned with the
use of preconviction transfers as a device allowing defendants to
avoid forfeiture.107 In codifying relation back, Congress meant to
permit the voiding of preconviction transfers made at less than
"arm's length" that allowed the defendant to avoid forfeiture,
and to close a "potential loophole" in the forfeiture statutes.'18
The legislative history states that relation back was not meant
to apply forfeiture to "innocent bona fide purchasers of the de-
fendant's property."'10 9
The forfeiture language exempts the transferee who can estab-
lish that he was reasonably without cause to believe the property
was subject to forfeiture." 0 The Senate report on the 1984
tutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.")
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
107. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 195-96, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 3378-79:
[T]he criminal forfeiture provisions of the RICO and CCE statutes fail ade-
quately to address the phenomenon of defendants defeating forfeiture by remov-
ing, transferring, or concealing their assets prior to conviction .... Thus, a per-
son who anticipates that some of his property may be subject to criminal
forfeiture has not only an obvious incentive, but also ample opportunity, to
transfer his assets or remove them from the jurisdiction of the court prior to
trial and so shield them from any possibility of forfeiture.
In sum, present criminal forfeiture statutes do not adequately address the se-
rious problem of a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets. Changes are
necessary both to preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal
forfeiture, and, in those cases in which he does transfer, deplete, or conceal his
property, to assure that he cannot as a result avoid the economic impact of
forfeiture.
108. Id. at 200-01, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3383-84.
109. Id. at 201, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3384.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. II 1984); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. II 1984).
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amendments provides: "[This] provision should be construed to
deny relief to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant
or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transac-
tions. The standard for relief reflects the principles concerning
voiding of transfers set out in 18 U.S.C. [§] 1963(c), as amended
by the bill." ' Though the statutory language is not necessarily
inconsistent with congressional intent as expressed in the legis-
lative history, neither is it limited to the kinds of transactions
against which Congress professed to have directed its efforts.
Where a transferee does not act as the defendant's nominee and
is not a party to a sham transfer, he still may be unable to make
the showing the statute requires to avoid forfeiture. Even
though the attorney, in all likelihood, is aware of the illicit ori-
gins of money used to pay his fee,112 or will be held to be on
notice of the possibility of forfeiture,115 payment of the fee is for
services rendered. Such a fee payment is an arm's length trans-
action rather than a sham."" Forfeiture of attorneys' fees in
such a case will do nothing to further Congress's avowed
purpose.
Further evidence that Congress, in the 1984 amendments to
criminal forfeiture, did not intend to apply forfeiture to attor-
neys' fees exists in a House Judiciary Committee report on an
earlier version of the CCE amendments whose language is essen-
tially the same as the 1984 amendments. In that report the
Committee stated explicitly that "[n]othing in this section [deal-
ing with in personam forfeiture] is intended to interfere with a
person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."115 Although the
Senate report on the final version of the forfeiture amendments
makes no mention of the right to counsel in connection with
111. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 209 n.47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONc.. &
AD. NEWS at 3392 n.47.
112. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985).
115. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as H.R. REP. No. 845]. The court in United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo.
1985), read this statement as a recognition of "the need to insure the right to counsel in
the context of third-party forfeiture of assets." Id. at 1347.
But see Payden v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Jan. 2, 1985), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1985). Payden rejected the Rogers court's interpretation of the legislative his-
tory. The court focused on the report's next sentence, which stated, "The Committee,
therefore does not resolve the conflict in the District Court opinions on the use of re-
straining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal case."
H.R. REP. No. 845, supra, at 19 n.1. The court concluded that, in the context of the
second sentence, the first sentence demonstrated only an intention to leave the resolu-
tion of the issue to the courts. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.15.
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criminal forfeiture," 6 in light of the threat to constitutional
rights presented by forfeiture of attorneys' fees, RICO and CCE
should not be so applied absent some clear indication that this
was Congress's intent. '
B. Reasonable Attorneys' Fees
A construction of the RICO and CCE amendments that ex-
empts from forfeiture money paid for legal services rendered
complies with the general principle that an attorney is at least
entitled to reasonable compensation for the value of his work."'
Courts have held that legal fees should be based upon principles
of quantum meruit" 9 and have exercised their inherent power to
reduce fees they find excessive.120 Although determining a valua-
tion for legal fees is an admittedly difficult task, 2' the courts'
responsibilities for supervision of the bar include the responsi-
bility of seeing that attorneys' fees are not excessive. 22 That the
court must determine a reasonable amount for legal fees in
RICO and CCE cases imposes no unusual burden.
A quantum meruit measure of attorneys' fees would guarantee
the attorney just compensation, thus preserving the defendant's
right to counsel. At the same time, limiting attorneys' fees in
RICO and CCE cases will facilitate criminal forfeiture's original
purpose of deterring crime. A quantum meruit limit would cre-
ate a presumption- that, to the extent that attorneys' fees exceed
116. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6.
117. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
118. See Glick v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 567 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (stating that where there is no express agreement between attorney and client,
the attorney may recover the reasonable value of services rendered), aff'd, 799 F.2d 753
(7th Cir. 1986); see also Mattioni, Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd. v. Ecological Shipping
Corp., 530 F. Supp. 910, 914 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (concluding that although the attorney is
precluded from suing on the terms of a contingency fee contract by virtue of an invalid
provision, the attorney is not disallowed from proceeding in quantum meruit).
119. Glick v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 567 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (N.D. Ill.
1983), aff'd, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1986); Mattioni, Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd. v. Ecologi-
cal Shipping Corp., 530 F. Supp. 910, 914 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Grimm v. Whitney-Fidalgo
Seafoods, 458 F. Supp. 5, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); DelNoce v. Delyar Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1051,
1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
120. See Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d
882, 888 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
121. See generally R. ARONSON, ATrORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION
AND REVIEW (1980).
122. Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1979); Esser v. A.H. Robins
Co., 537 F. Supp. 197, 200 (D. Minn. 1982); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1984) (requiring that a lawyer's fee be reasonable).
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the reasonable value of the legal services, the defendant is doing
something other than compensating his attorney-namely, using
attorneys' fees as a disguise to avoid the forfeiture penalty. Be-
cause this is the problem Congress meant to address with the
forfeiture amendments, ss the courts should limit attorneys' fees
forfeitures to such cases.
CONCLUSION
The government's use of the criminal forfeiture provisions of
RICO and CCE to compel lawyers representing convicted clients
to forfeit their fees creates far more problems than it solves. Al-
though forfeiture of attorneys' fees may be consistent with the
language of the statutes, it is not consistent with the constitu-
tional guarantees of due process and right to counsel, nor is it
consistent with Congress's intent in enacting criminal forfeiture.
An exemption from forfeiture for reasonable attorneys' fees will
solve these problems and also maintain criminal forfeiture's
value as a deterrent to crime by preventing the use of sham
transfers to avoid the forfeiture penalty.
-Gregory Merz
123. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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